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Abstract—This paper introduces a procedural method based on
the fuzzy logic and set theory, which analyzes the risk of an IT-
System in a facility and its surrounding area. The method analyzes
the susceptibility of an electronic system with respect to inten-
tional electromagnetic interferences and classifies the intentional
electromagnetic environment (IEME). It extends the well-known
statistical-based models fault tree analysis, electromagnetic topol-
ogy and Bayesian networks (BN) with imprecise data, uncertain-
ness with linguistic terms, and opinions of experts. In a final step,
the critical scenarios and the elements and the location that con-
tribute most to the risk are identified, which can be used to enhance
the protection level.
Index Terms—Decision making under risk, electromagnetic
(EM) effects, fuzzy logic, fuzzy rules, fuzzy sets, intentional elec-
tromagnetic environment (IEME), intentional electromagnetic in-
terference (IEMI), probabilistic risk analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE vulnerability of failures of modern electronic systemshas increased in the last decades by intentional electro-
magnetic interference (IEMI). One reason is the increasing
dependence on computer networks, wireless communications,
microelectronics, other sensitive electronic systems, and the
strong interconnection between these different electronic
devices. Partial failures of a system are able to lead to a
malfunction of the total function based on that strong inter-
connection. Another reason is the growing risk of occurring of
such high-power electromagnetic (HPEM) sources that range
from simple homemade devices to advanced military sources.
The hazard of such IEMI scenarios is adopted by the
“Resolution on criminal activities using electromagnetic tools”
in 1999 by the URSI [1]. Later the scenario of IEMI is
investigated in several scientific reports [2], [3]. Due to this
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situation, a protection from IEMI threats is necessary and
therefore a systematic protection concept is needed.
To handle the risk assessment with its complexity and the
strong interconnection of the IT infrastructure a statistical math-
ematical approach is needed for the risk analysis. Probabilistic
risk analysis is a well-known method from the aerospace, chem-
ical, and nuclear industries [4]. In 2013, a concept of stochastic
modeling for HPEM risk at system level was introduced by
Sabath [5] and Genender [6]. Therein, a procedural method for
systematic analysis of these risks is presented.
The used statistical mathematical approaches to calculate the
risk susceptibility of electronic systems under the condition of
electromagnetic radiation are the fault tree analysis (FTA) by
Genender [6], the electromagnetic topology (EMT), and the
Bayesian networks (BN) by Mao [7].
These methods are limited by processing crisp data, which
have to be set exactly and the probabilities have to be known.
The risk analysis are often specified only vaguely and their
probabilities are based on experts estimations. According to the
complexity of IT-Systems and their dependent interconnection
and the inherent uncertainty of all possibilities, the fuzzy num-
bers are an appropriate mathematical description of nonprecise
data. Often only linguistic terms are used to describe the risk of
systems, such as the HPEM risk assessment cube from Sabath
[8], which is defined by the threat level, mobility (ML), and
technological challenge. These terms could be transformed into
fuzzy sets with different kinds of boundaries and membership
functions. These soft or crossing boundaries are an advantage
of the fuzzy probability theory. The fuzzy logic and set theory is
used to determine the risk of a target system in a facility and its
surrounding area. The approach (see Section II) turns every data
into a computational mathematic. For that, the failure propaga-
tion is estimated for series and parallel circuits (see Section III)
and the fuzzy rules (see Section IV) to combine the linguistic
terms. The risk analysis based on the fuzzy theory (see Section
V) divides the complexity in three parts: the breakdown failure
probability of the victim system, the hazard of IEMI sources in
zones of accessibility and a classification of the whole environ-
ment. An exemplary scenario (see Section VI) is used to discuss
the approach to improve the protection against IEMI threats.
II. FUZZY APPROACH
The approach [9] is based on the set theory and the Boolean al-
gebra. In 1965, Zadeh [10] introduced the fuzzy set as a model
to deal with imprecise, inconsistent, and inexact information.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Fig. 1. Breakdown failure probability with fuzzy sets [9].
A fuzzy set is a class of objects with a continuum of grades of
membership. Zadeh [10] defines that a set A˜ of X is character-
ized by a membership function μA (x) that associates with each
point in X a real number in the interval [0, 1], with the values
of μA (x) at x representing the grade of membership of x in A˜.
The degree of x belonging to A is expressed with the following
equation:
A˜ = {(x, μA (x))|x ∈ X} with μA : X → [0, 1]. (1)
Typical membership shapes are triangle, trapezoid, sigmoidal,
or Gaussian bell. Further, more flexible classes of membership
functions are possible [9], for example, the distribution density
functions to describe the breakdown failure probability (BFP) or
destruction failure probability [11] (DFP) of electronic systems.
For example, the beta density function is used to estimate the
BFP with a random angle of incident of a system and is written
as follows:
μBFP(x;α, β) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 x ≤ 0,
∫ x
0 f(t;α, β)dt 0 < x ≤ 1
1 x > 1
(2)
where f(t;α, β) is the standard beta probability density function
(PDF)
f(t;α, β) =
{
1
B (α,β ) t
α−1(1− t)β−1 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(3)
and B(α, β) is the beta function with both the shape factors α
and β, which defines the form of the shape, and x is the electro-
magnetic field strength normalized on the maximum (20 kV in
Fig. 1), which is shown in Fig. 1.
The fuzzy logic is a multivalued logic and the known operator
from the typical Boolean operations from the two-valued logic
is not directly transferable, as similar aggregation operators, the
union (maximum), intersection (minimum), and complement
(negation) from the classical set theory, are used to combine
the different fuzzy sets. Based on the Takagi and Sugeno model
[12], the typically aggregation operators of two sets A as μA (x)
and B as μB (x) are defined as follows:
Fig. 2. Comparison of the membership for an element in the (a) classical
(b) and fuzzy set theory.
Fig. 3. (a) Serial and (b) parallel compound of a system.
union : A ∪B ⇔ μA∪B (x) = μA (x) ∪ μB (x) =
max {μA (x), μB (x)}
intersection : A ∩B ⇔ μA∩B (x) = μA (x) ∩ μB (x) =
min {μA (x), μB (x)}
complement : Aˆ ⇔ μAˆ (x) = 1− μA (x).
The membership for an element differs between the classic
and the fuzzy set theory. In Fig. 2, both types of membership
of an element to a set are presented. In the classic set theory
[Fig. 2(a)], an element is a member or not a member of the
set. Instead the fuzzy set theory [Fig. 2(b)] defines a degree of
membership to that set.
III. FAILURE PROPAGATION
The BFP of a single device is shown in Fig. 1, in which the
breakdown depends on the magnitude of the electric field and
for a typical waveform adopted from Genender [11]. Typical
waveforms are damped sine wave pulse, double exponential
pulse, burst, and continuous wave. Each of them leads to a
different BFP and has to be considered for the estimation.
The failure of this system can propagate in a network to
another device and can lead to a misbehavior or its malfunction.
To estimate this effect of the failure propagation from one to
another system, the different membership functions have to be
combined.
Two different kinds of interconnection between two or more
systems are possible. The first one is the serial circuit shown
in Fig. 3 (a) and the second one is the parallel circuit shown
in Fig. 3(b). The BFP of a compound of series interconnected
systems is estimated with the maximum operator as follows:
μseries(x) = max {μ1(x), μ2(x), ..., μ(x)n |x ∈ X} . (4)
A failure of one subsystem leads to the breakdown of the
entire system. The BFP for a parallel circuits of two or more
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Fig. 4. Four different BFPs.
Fig. 5. Parallel compounds of a system.
subsystems is estimated with the minimum operator
μparallel(x) = min {μ1(x), μ2(x), ..., μn (x)|x ∈ X} . (5)
The entire system still works without any errors until every
subsystem is disturbed. In Fig. 4, four different BFP functions
are shown, with the result for the maximum operator BFPSys−1
and the minimum operator BFPSys−4 . With the combination of
serial and parallel elements, it is possible to estimate the failure
propagation and its effect to complex systems composed of
different subsystems, which are shown in Fig. 5.
The propagation path is divided into the above and below path
and both are combined with the minimum operator (8). The first
path (6) is composed of three serial elements, where one element
is a parallel subsystem consisting of three devices. The below
path in Fig. 5 is also composed of three elements connected in
series in which the first and the last one is a parallel subsystem
consisting of two elements
μAbove(x) = max{μSub1(x), (min{μSub4(x), μSub5(x),
μSub6(x)}), μSub8 |x ∈ X} (6)
μBelow (x) = max {(min{μSub2(x), μSub3(x)}), μSub7(x),
(min{μSub9(x), μsub10(x)})|x ∈ X} (7)
μSystem(x) = min {μAbove(x), μBelow (x)|x ∈ X} . (8)
IV. FUZZY RULES
The combination of measurement data, PDFs and expert opin-
ions defined in linguistic terms are achieved with the fuzzy
rules. It is possible to combine these different kinds of input
data in one mathematical model. This rules can be considered
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF TWO RULES WITH THE MAMDANI METHOD [13]
No. Rule
R1 IF x is A1 AND y is B1 THEN z is C1
R2 IF x is A2 AND y is B2 THEN z is C2
Fig. 6. Fuzzy rules with fuzzification and defuzzification [14].
as the knowledge of an expert who knows exactly the system
behavior. These rules are represented by a sequence of the form
IF-THEN and they associate a condition described by linguistic
variables and/or fuzzy sets with a conclusion or an output. More
than one input could be combined by the mentioned operators of
Section II. The IF part is used to capture the knowledge by using
the input conditions and the THEN part can be utilized to obtain
the conclusion or output in linguistic variable form. An example
for two typical fuzzy rules with two inputs is shown in Table I.
An example of using the rules to estimate risk with different
inputs is shown in Fig. 6. The inputs (e1 to en ) are mapped
on membership functions (fuzzification), the rules estimate the
dependencies, and the defuzzification mapped, for example, the
results on a risk-level metric.
V. RISK ANALYSIS BASED ON FUZZY
The expression “risk” has different and misleading meanings;
Genender [6] defines the risk as the probability of a hazardous
and severity event. Sabath [15] categorizes the criticality of the
IEMI effect in five linguistic categories that are as follows:
1) no effect or no consequence (undisturbed);
2) interference (limited);
3) degradation (severe);
4) loss of main function/mission kill (very severe); and
5) loss of system (catastrophically).
To analyze the risk of an IEMI scenario we need information
about the victim system, the area plan of the infrastructure, and
the possible IEMI sources that can harm the investigated system.
For the last point, many data are published, for example by Mora
[16] and Sabath [17]. The last one is mostly bonded to their
places and is highly improbable to disturb the victim system.
Sabath [8] classifies the sources in ML, technology challenge
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TABLE II
HL OF SOURCES AND ML LEVEL [9]
HL Description Amplitude ML Description
XL low < 0,1 kV/m 1 stationary
L little 0,1–1 kV/m 2 transportable
M middle 1–10 kV/m 3 mobile
H high 10–100 kV/m 4 very mobile
XH very high > 100 kV/m 5 highly mobile
Fig. 7. Security rings of protection [9].
Fig. 8. Combination of the three main fuzzy sets [14].
(TC), availability, and its hazard level (HL). The classification
for the ML and the HL is shown in Table II .
The ML of an IEMI source is described as the capability of
that source to come close to the victim system. Genender [6] de-
fined the aspect ML as the compiled aspects such as dimensions,
weight, need of special supplies, integrability into platforms sys-
tems or shelters, and the ability to operate in motion.
The area plan of the infrastructure with the surrounding area
and the buildings have to be studied and divided into zones of
accessibility. The security rings of protection in Fig. 7 by Peikert
[9] are used for the zoning of the area.
The last important point is the breakdown failure behavior of
the desired system. Therefore, measurements (see Fig. 1) and
expert opinions are needed to classify the BFP of the system.
If every data and terms are obtained, everything has to be
turned into fuzzy membership functions. In the beginning, the
three categories, the area plan, the intentional electromagnetic
environment (IEME) sources, and the BFP of the whole system
are calculated and everything is combined at the end with the
intersection operator, as shown in Fig. 8 . The susceptibility
of the whole system has to be estimated. Therefore, the victim
Fig. 9. Fuzzy Sets for the probability of occurrence for IEMI sources [9]:
(a) membership function and (b) min {μTC, μHL, μFoE, μML} .
Fig. 10. Fuzzy set for the risk-level membership functions [14].
system is divided into subsystems and the dependencies between
each subsystem have to be determined. The result for the whole
system is obtained with the union of each subsystem BFP, n and
is expressed as follows:
μBFP ,total = max {μBFP,1 , μBFP,2 , ..., μBFP,n} . (9)
The probability of occurrence of an IEMI source is determined
by the TC of such sources, the availability, the ML, its HL, and
the frequency of event (FoE). The estimation with the fuzzy
theory approach is shown by Peikert [9] and in Fig. 9 , where
one combination of the each membership function and its inter-
section result is presented.
Finally, an outline of the surrounding area with its buildings
is required. The location of the system under consideration has
to be determined and the zones of accessibility have to be inte-
grated into the plan. At the end, each result has to be mapped
onto the risk-level membership function. The risk level, shown
in Fig. 10 , is divided into 11 parts, it starts with no risk, passes
in the middle the moderate risk, and ends with very high risk.
VI. SCENARIO FOR THE FUZZY APPROACH
A map with accessibility zones and classified ML levels
[Fig. 11(a)] for these zones by Genender [6] are used as a sce-
nario for the risk analysis approach. The analysis of the scenario
is divided into the analysis of the target system, the sources of
disturbance and the environment.
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Fig. 11. (a) Accessibility zones and classified ML levels for these zones
needed by Genender [6] and (b) failure rate of an MCU compound by
Peikert [14].
A. Target System
As a victim system, a complex compound of microcontroller
(MCU) are used, in which breakdown failure probability is stud-
ied by Peikert [14]. In Fig. 11(b), the number of failures are
shown for the compound after exposing with a double exponen-
tial pulse. As a pulse generator, the PBG7 from the company
Kentech is used as an IEMI source. The compound in Fig. 11(b)
is exposed in a GTEM cell for one minute with 100, 200, 500, or
1000 pulses and the level of each column stands for the number
of breakdowns. This measurement setup is used to determine the
BFP for the MCU compound. The setup comprises a core unit,
which communicates and analyzes every other unit (MCU1,
MCU2, and MCU3). MCU1 is used as a system of three in
series, which needs the calculation result from the unit before.
MCU2 is designed as a redundant system and MCU3 works
with different communication protocols (twi, spi, and ethernet).
BFP of the whole system is calculated from the measurements
of each subsystem and every result is combined with the union
operator:
μBFP,MCU1 = max{μBFP,MCU1−1 , μBFP,MCU1−2 ,
μBFP,MCU1−3} (10)
μBFP,MCU2 = max{μBFP,MCU2−1 , μBFP,MCU2−2 ,
μBFP,MCU3−3} (11)
μBFP,MCU3 = max{μBFP,MCU3−1 , μBFP,MCU3−2 ,
μBFP,MCU3−3} (12)
μBFP ,total = max{μBFP,core, μBFP ,MCU1 ,
μBFP,MCU2 , μBFP,MCU3}. (13)
B. Classification of the IEMI Source
Mora [16] published a list of existing IEMI sources and gath-
ered the information of peak field, rise-time, technology level
by Giri [18], the cost level by Sabath [8], the probability level
of ITU [19], and more for the most available sources. The fuzzy
theory approach to classify the probability of occurrence and
the risk level is shown in the work of Peikert [9]. These clas-
sifications consider the four categories of HL, ML level, avail-
ability, and TC. Sabath [20] discusses a technique that enables
the assessment of key parameters of various IEMEs. With his
Fig. 12. (a) Mapping of the availability on the probability of occurrence and
(b) the mapping of the cost on the probability of occurrence by Sabath [20]
(gray bar: expert valuation; dashed line: approximated function).
TABLE III
SCALE FOR AVAILABILITY (SFA) (COMPONENTS AND/OR SOURCE) BY
SABATH [20]
AVac Availability Description
category
1 Off-the-shelf Available in the commercial marketplace (e.g.,
department stores); can be bought by anyone
2 Commercially available Available in specialty stores; can be bought by
anyone
3 Specialized trade Available only in specialized trading companies;
acquisition is limited to commercial customer
4 Limited acquisition Limited acquisition under conditions or to
registered buyer, special designed components
5 Restricted acquisition Trade or acquisition prohibited by law
technique, Sabath estimates the likelihood that an offender has
access to such an IEMI source. Some of the experts’ opinions
for the availability are shown in Fig. 12 (a) and the costs are
shown in Fig. 12(b). The used categories and the meanings of
the availability are shown in Table III .
Extending the approach of Peikert [9], with the additional
experts opinion from Sabath [20], delivers a new rate of the risk
level of an IEMI source. Therefore, the fuzzy sets for the kind of
sources that are possible (14) are combined with the achievable
values of field magnitude next to the target system (15) and the
sets for the expert opinions (16)
A˜field = {(x, μfield(x))|x ∈ X} (14)
A˜source = {(x, μsource(x))|x ∈ X} (15)
A˜expert = {(x, μexpert(x))|x ∈ X} . (16)
As an example, the combination of the SfA, scale for required
knowledge (SfrK), cost scale (CS), and the level of sophistica-
tion (LoS) lead to the TC of an IEMI source shown in Fig. 13 .
The results are the linguistic terms low tech., medium tech., high
tech., and highly sophisticated systems according to Sabath [5]
and are used to estimate the HL of this combination for such
source. An example for the used fuzzy rules to combine the
inputs are shown in Table IV .
With the different fuzzy systems of the TC, IEMI sources, and
some more according to the published characteristics of Sabath
[5], Mansson [21], [22], and Giri [18], the type of the IEMI
source and its possible output power range can be estimated.
The used MATLAB–Simulink model is shown in Fig. 14 . This
model combined the results of the three fuzzy systems: ML and
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Fig. 13. Fuzzy system for the TC.
TABLE IV
EXAMPLE OF FUZZY RULES FOR THE TC
No. Rule
R1 IF (SfA is restricted acquisition) AND (SfrK is expert) AND
(CS is extreme cost) AND (LoS is de-velopment group)
THEN (TC is highly sophisticated)
R2 IF (SfA is of-the-shelf) AND (Sfrk is novice) AND
(CS is low cost) AND (LoS is open literature)
THEN (TC is low tech system)
R3 IF (SfA is commercial available) AND (Sfrk is specialist) AND
(CS is increased cost) AND (LoS is technical literature)
THEN (TC is medium tech system)
Fig. 14. MATLAB–Simulink model for the estimation of the risk from the
inputs ML, TC, and LoD.
accessibility, likelihood of detection, and the TC. The obtained
results imply the risk that arises from that type of HPEM source.
These are used to predict the risk level of the investigated system.
The risk level for the target system is addicted to the measured
electromagnetic stress level of every MCU and is estimated by
beta distribution in (2) and (3). The fuzzy sets for each BFP and
Fig. 15. Risk level in dependence on the field and probability of occurrence
of an IEMI source by Peikert [9].
its dependence on other ones are obtained with the following
equation:
A˜BFP = {(x, μBFP(x))|x ∈ X} and (17)
A˜depending = {(x, μdepending(x))|x ∈ X} . (18)
The risk level of the victim system is addicted to its own electro-
magnetic stress level, the dependence between all subsystems,
the achievable field magnitude, and the probability of occurrence
of an IEMI source that can deliver that field magnitude. After
mapping the results onto the risk-level membership function in
Fig. 10, we obtain that the risk depends on the probability of oc-
currence and the amplitude of the electromagnetic field, which
is shown in Fig. 15 .
C. Classification of the IEME
Now, the estimation for the risk level of the combined target
system and sources with their achievable field magnitude have to
be combined with the area map with its accessibility zones and
required ML shown in Fig. 11(a). The target system is located
in the accessibility zone number five with the highest limitation
for the ML level. It is located in a building with the ML higher
than four. The area is bounded by a fence and is categorized with
three or higher. The zone in the line of sight of the building and
its surrounding area is categorized with the level equal to three
or higher. Everything out of sight has the ML level two or lower.
The lowest level needs a stationary building and is disregarded
in this scenario.
The zones represented the discoverability of an IEMI sources,
which affect the rate of the HL. The higher the rate of ML level
of a zone, the more likely the source can be detected by a
security measure and the lower the rate of the HL. To integrate
the dependence of hazard and ML in the zones, a fuzzy set for
the limitation of the five zones is used. Therefore, a trapezoidal
membership function with the boundaries a and b is used and
expressed as follows:
μzone,i(x) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 x ≤ a,
b−x
b−a a < x ≤ b,
0 x > b.
(19)
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TABLE V
VALUES FOR a AND b FOR THE AREA MEMBERSHIP FUNCTION
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
a = 1 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.1
b = – 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.2
Fig. 16. Four limitation fuzzy membership functions for the zones of the map.
(a) Zone 1. (b) Zone 1. (c) Zone 1. (d) Zone 1.
The used boundary factors a and b for the membership function
are shown in Table V. The resulting fuzzy sets for the zone
number 1–4 are shown in Fig. 16. In the following step, a grid
of squares is added as a layer on the map of the area. For every
square, the distance from its center to the center of the target
system is estimated. The size of the squares is chosen in order
to cover the area well and establish transitions between the
accessibility zones as a boundary between two squares. Each
square obtained the following data:
1) zone number;
2) boundary to another zone;
3) HL;
4) ML level;
5) distance to target system;
6) resulting field magnitude.
These data are used to assess the field magnitude with the far-
field condition that leads to an attenuation of the field strength
by a factor of 1/r, in which r is the distance from the center
of the square to the center of the victim system. The result is
a matrix of values for the maximum possible peak amplitude
which might radiate from a square to the target system. The
magnitude values of every square are compared with the break-
down failure probability of the system and are mapped on the
risk-level membership function in Fig. 10.
D. Fuzzy Approach Result
From the results of Sections VI-A–VI-B, with the field
strength and breakdown failure behavior of the target system, a
TABLE VI
RISK ESTIMATION OF AN EVENT [9]
Risk level Probability of Damage Criteria
0–1 No risk Occurrence of the damage is unlikely
2–4 Low Occurrence of the damage is low
5–7 Moderate Occasionally occurring damage
8–9 High Damage occurs in more than half of the exposure
10–11 Very high Occurs in almost every exposure
Fig. 17. Layer of the risk-level metric overlaid on the area map [14].
risk-level metric is created. The risk-level metric is divided into
11 subregions from zero to one. Zero is the lowest risk level,
what represents the IEMI sources that are not able to harm the
victim system. The highest rate of the level, specified with one,
leads to a damage of the system in almost every exposure. A
detailed list is shown in Table VI.
In means of the risk-level metric, a colored square mesh is
created. The colorbar starts with white or no color (no risk), it
follows blue as low risk, moves to yellow (moderate risk), and
ends with dark red (very high risk). This mesh is added as a
layer on the area map of the zone of accessibility [Fig. 11(a)]
and shown in Fig. 17. This map shows locations in which an
IEMI source can harm the victim system. In this example, the
victim system is located in the upper right corner of the area
and an IEMI source in zone number two, on the right-hand side
of the victim system, has a risk level of 0.6 to harm the system.
This location is a point of interest for a high protection level of
the system and it has to be considered in the EMC shielding of
the system.
VII. CONCLUSION
An approach based on fuzzy logic and set theory, which ex-
tends the well-known risk analysis method, EMT, FTA, and
BN to handle nonprecise data and uncertainness of linguistic
terms with the fuzzy set theory, is introduced. The method adds
subjective information, uncertain data, nonphysical quantities,
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crossing boundaries, and the opinion of experts to the assess-
ment of risk, which can still be simulated with a numerical or
analytical math program. The approach divides an IEMI sce-
nario into the breakdown behavior of the target system, cate-
gorizes the IEMI sources regarding to the zone of accessibility,
and classifies the IEME with its surrounding area and buildings.
The combination of these three parts leads to the end of a risk-
level metric, which defines locations for sources that can harm
the victim system. This information can be used to increase the
protection level of the investigated system.
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